Oil Supply Update

Stuart at Early Warning has returned with one of his once monthly oil supply updates - Oil Supply Update.

Nothing very dramatic happened in the last three months: supply continued to inch up, and prices are a little lower than during most of the last couple of years, but $100 remains an effective floor for Brent ...

This last picture shows also (green line) the narrower definition of oil given by "Crude and Condensate", which has been flatter than the "all liquids" represented by the black line.

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The exploding supply of NGLs can this stuff be called oil

John Kingston at "The Barrel" has a post on the growing production of natural gas liquids - The exploding supply of NGLs: can this stuff be called oil?.

If The Oil Drum were still around, the contributors would certainly be talking about a new ESAI study.

The Boston-based consultancy put out a press release today, touting a new report it has produced that says by 2023, NGL production will account for more than one-quarter of the world’s liquids output.

To which the peak oil believers might say: exactly.

One argument often made by the peak oil school is that the rise in liquids output around the world does not eliminate any suggestion that oil production has peaked, because so much of what is coming out of the ground isn’t really oil. Instead, much of it is NGLs, which are far less versatile in what can be produced from them. Specifically, they have virtually no value in making distillates, the oil product most in demand in rising economies.

an increasing supply of natural gas from areas as diverse as the Middle East and Australia is pumping out a lot of NGLs along with that rise, and that’s adding to the percentage of NGLs in the total world liquids pool. You can see it in the price: NWE propane now runs about 60% of the price of Brent, and in 2008, it averaged close to 70%.

The question for the global market is whether innovation can take some way of making what could be a growing surplus of ultra-light petroleum products like NGLs or condensate and figure out a way to help them satisfy other petroleum demand. The rising supplies of these types of ultra-light petroleum feedstocks is great news for the petrochemical industry, particularly in the US, but it does take something off the ebullience of those proclaiming the end of peak oil. All barrels most certainly are not alike.

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Saudi Arabia did not make up for lost Libyan oil production

Stuart at Early Warning has a post on global oil production in the wake of the Libyan crisis (see the original for lots more graphs) - Saudi Arabia did not make up for Libyan Oil.

The OPEC MOMR came out late yesterday, but it adds to the picture from the IEA report mentioned yesterday morning. In particular, I can now present revised graphs for total liquid fuel production. Heres the last three year view (not zero scaled):

Note that the rise thats been going in since last fall has now been abruptly interrupted by the Libyan situation, and total oil production has fallen by about 0.5mbd. This is about 0.6% of global production, but given that the world economy has been growing rapidly and needing about another 0.5mbd/month, the shortfall over what would have happened in a counterfactual world with no Middle Eastern unrest is more like 1.2% of global production.

In terms of the price production picture, this has put us much more into territory akin to the 2005-2008 oil shock:

We can put the situation almost entirely down to two things: the fact that Libyan production has plummeted, and that Saudi Arabia has made no significant move to compensate. In fact, Saudi Arabia slowed down production increases that it had been making in prior months. First, heres all the Libyan data currently available:

So the world has abruptly lost something like 1.3mbd of oil production between mid February and March. Now there were a lot of news reports in the business press at the time this was first happening that Saudi Arabia was going to make up the difference. ...

Now that the stats are out, we can see that this was total bull. Will that fact be all over the business press? My bet is youll have to read some obscure blog called Early Warning to find out what really happened. First off, heres all the Saudi production data I have (not zero scaled to better show changes):

Indeed Saudi production has increased to around 9mbd, but the timing makes it clear this has nothing to do with Libya. For better comparison, I have put both the Libyan and Saudi averages on the same graph (only since 2005), with the scales adjusted to allow easy comparison. In particular, note that the size of the units on both scales is the same, so similar vertical moves in both curves mean the same amount of oil, but the Saudi scale (left hand scale) has been shifted to put the Saudi curve next to the Libyan one (right scale):

I have circled the March data in each case. You can see what was going on. The Saudis were slowly increasing their production from last fall through February, presumably in response to growing global demand and rising prices. But then, in March, when Libyan production went into freefall, they put on the brakes and did almost nothing to make up for the shortage.

The burning question is: why? Back in 2006, when their production started to gradually decline from 9.5mbd even as global oil prices were in the worst spike since the 1970s, I was an advocate of the view that the decline was largely involuntary: theyd never produced more than 9.5mbd, theyd underinvested for decades, and some of their big fields were getting very tired (particular northern Ghawar and Abqaiq) and they were starting a big rash of new projects and ramping up their rig counts at the same time.

I see current events differently. The reduction in late 2008 was clearly voluntary to support prices in the face of the great recession. Theres no new projects announced, and the rig count hasnt taken off. So my take is that the failure to increase production to compensate for Libya is deliberate. We can only speculate, but my guess is that, having watched how the west has helped to ease Mubarak and Ben-Ali out of power and is intervening in Libya to the same end, the Saudi regime is in no mood to care about our desire for more oil. Instead, they are very much in the mood to build as large a war chest as possible with which to appease their own population, strengthen their defense measures, etc.

So, instead of Saudi production increasing to compensate for Libya, total world production decreased, and oil prices went up sharply to enforce the necessary conservation on the worlds oil consumers. ...

So, heres the latest data on the discount of the three Saudi grades of oil, to Brent (with a seven week moving average applied to reduce noise):

You can see that these discounts have actually fallen sharply in recent weeks to levels usually seen only in the depths of recessions when the Saudis are trying to raise prices. So rather than trying to flood the market with their oil to help supplies post Libya, the Saudis are ramping back and extracting every dollar they can get.

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Chart of Australian Oil Consumption and Production

Phil at TOD ANZ has a chart showing Australias widening oil import gap - Chart of Australian Oil Consumption and Production.

This graph of Australian oil consumption and production is based on the BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2011. I prepared it for a local government workshop later this week and thought Id post it here for others to use.

Australia is one of very few OECD countries where oil consumption is still rising in this high oil price environment, albeit slowly. You can thank the resource economy for that (and the related strength of the Australian dollar).

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Oil and water

Reuters has an article on Saudi Arabia’s water troubles and the increasing percentage of oil production going towards running desalination plants - Oil and water - Saudi Arabias Resource Puzzle

Water use in the desert kingdom is already almost double the per capita global average and increasing at an ever faster rate with the rapid expansion of Saudi Arabias population and industrial development.

Riyadh in 2008 abandoned what was in retrospect clearly a flawed plan to achieve self-sufficiency in wheat and aims to be 100 percent reliant on imports by 2016. "The decision to import is to preserve water," said Saudi Deputy Minister of Agriculture for Research and Development Abdullah al-Obaid. "Its not a matter of cost. The government buys wheat at prices higher than in the local market."
…

Agriculture is the single biggest user [of water], absorbing 85-90 percent of the kingdoms supplies, according to Saudis deputy minister of agriculture for research and development. Of that, almost 80-85 percent came from underground aquifers.

With average annual rainfall around 100 mm (4 inches), Saudis ancient underground aquifers are its lifeblood.

But just as peak oil theorists believe the worlds conventional oil supplies are at or near their peak, proponents of the peak water view have said the resource has been irreversibly drained.

Booz and Company has said some of the regions aquifers -- also referred to as "fossil water" as they contain rain that fell thousands of years ago -- have become too salty to drink.

Injecting water into oilfields has also had an impact, although sea water is now generally used to maintain reservoir pressure.

The alternative to desalination -- the energy-intensive process of converting salt water to fresh water -- robs Saudi Arabia of its other precious resource, oil, by eating up both fuel and fuel revenues.

Saudi Arabias Saline Water Conversion Corp (SWCC) produces 3.36 million cubic meters of desalinated water per day, a daily cost of 8.6 million riyals based on the SWCCs 2009 figures -- the latest available -- when the cost of producing one cubic meter of desalinated water was 2.57 riyals. Transporting it added an extra 1.12 riyals per cubic meter.

Analysts and industry leaders say the authorities need to pass on more of the costs to the end-user to curb demand and reduce waste -- an argument that holds true for power and fuel but which requires very careful handling in the case of water.

"It is necessary to raise water tariffs," Isao Takekoh, a director at the U.S.-based International Desalination Association, said. "But it should be conducted very carefully and step-by-step because water is, needless to say, indispensable for human life."

By burning up energy, desalination reduces the amount of crude available for lucrative export markets. Takekoh estimated energy represented between 45 and 55 percent of unit production costs.

The International Energy Agency and analysts at HSBC bank estimated Saudi Arabias rate of direct crude burning more than doubled from 2008 to 2010 because of a rapid rise in power demand and a shortage of natural gas. How much of that went to desalination is not known but experts believe it is significant.

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Has The World Reached Economic Peak Oil

The peak oil world seems to have (thankfully) mostly moved from viewing the defining aspect of the peak of oil production as a function of oil in the ground to being a function of the price it takes to produce new oil - David Strahan has a good example of this at his blog - HAS THE WORLD REACHED ECONOMIC PEAK OIL? .

Whisper it. Oil production in the US is increasing. The country where output peaked in 1970 and then shrank by 40 per cent over four decades, has turned some kind of corner. Between 2008 and 2010, production rebounded by 800,000 barrels per day to 7.5 million barrels per day, and analysts forecast more growth to come. Goldman Sachs predicts that by 2017 production in the US could reach almost 11 mb/d, just shy of its all-time high, restoring the country to its former glory as the world’s biggest producer. ...

Indeed, if the world is suddenly awash with oil, somebody forgot to tell the oil market. Oil remains stubbornly above $100 per barrel of Brent crude, the main international benchmark. Most analysts agree this is because supply is struggling to keep pace with demand, despite weakening western economies. But if all this extra oil is coming on-stream, how come?

Part of the reason is down to short-term unforeseen disruptions, such as the Deepwater Horizon disaster in theGulf of Mexico last year which delayed many drilling projects, and the Libyan revolution which cut global supply by almost 1.6 mb/d. The impact of these events should fade in time but there are clearly deeper forces at work. Producing oil is getting harder.

Not that it was ever easy. The amount of oil produced by existing fields is always in decline because as oil is extracted, pressure in the reservoir falls and the oil comes out more slowly. As a result, every year the industry must drill new wells capable of supplying around 3 mb/d – or 30 per cent of Saudi Arabia’s production – just to stand still. Satisfying the growth in global demand, at least when the economy is expanding, requires roughly another 1.5 mb/d annually.

Filling these holes gets more difficult as the “easy oil” gets scarcer. Companies are now exploring to the ends of the earth – from the Falklands to the Arctic– and are drilling reservoirs that are deeper, hotter and higher pressure than ever, all of which raise new engineering challenges. That has pushed costs up massively, with effects that have yet to be widely understood.

Offshore, companies are working at ever greater depths. During the 1980s and 1990s, for instance, Petrobras, Brazil’s state oil company, made most of its offshore discoveries beneath about 3 kilometres of sea and rock. In 2007, it found the Lula field, about 7 km down. Drilling Lula needed 4 km more specialist steel pipe at a time when steel prices were soaring because of higher energy costs.

Even onshore, costs are rising. Shale-oil fracking wells typically run horizontally and need four times as much steel as a vertical well. According to analysts at JPMorgan, such inflation is rampant throughout the industry. Exxon’s production investments, for instance, soared from $15 billion per quarter in the 1990s to more than $100 billion in the second quarter of 2008 – while the amount of oil and gas it produced scarcely changed.

Some of the most costly oil comes from the tar sands of Canada, with its vast open-cast mines and energy-intensive production processes. According to investment bank Barclays Capital, new projects here need to earn as much as $90 a barrel just to break even. Saudi Arabia, the only country with meaningful spare production capacity, could have produced oil more cheaply a few years ago, but not now. It has increased public spending following the Arab Spring, and now needs $95 per barrel to balance its budget. These pressures, says Paul Horsnell, director of commodities research at Barclays, mean that oil prices are unlikely to fall below these levels unless the economy collapses. He forecasts $137 per barrel in 2015, and $185 in 2020.

So if there is lots of oil down there but it is much more costly to produce, can we have as much as we want if we are prepared to pay for it? Well, that depends on what you judge to be enough and who you mean by “we”, says Steven Kopits, US managing director of energy consultants Douglas Westwood.

The trouble is, high oil prices don’t just encourage oil companies to innovate, they also damage national economies – although some countries are more resilient than others. A penetrating analysis by Kopits found that historically theUSgoes into recession whenever it spends more than about 4.5 per cent of its GDP on oil. Today, that would equate to $90 a barrel. That level also holds for others in the OECD club of wealthy nations, says Kopits. But the evidence suggests thatChinais willing to pay more; it only cuts back on oil purchases when they account for more than 6 per cent of its GDP, equivalent to about $110 per barrel.

The disparity, says Kopits, arises because Chinese society assigns more value to a barrel of oil. Gaining a barrel can transform the lives of Chinese people – allowing them to travel by car for the first time, for example. In the west, losing a barrel merely means trading in a gas-guzzler for a more fuel efficient model.

But oil is so useful that nobody cuts back voluntarily, meaning prices must rise to excruciating levels to force rich western consumers to economise. The first “peak oil recession” started in 2009, says Kopits. It took oil at $147 a barrel and the deepest recession since the 1930s to prise oil from the grip of consumers in OECD countries. Since early 2008, OECD oil consumption has fallen by 4 mb/d, while non-OECD consumption – mainly inChina– has gained 6 mb/d. Global oil production rose 2 mb/d during that period, so developing countries have consumed all the additional supply plus that given up by industrialised economies. “China is bidding away the OECD oil supply,” says Kopits, “and recessions are the mechanism by which that oil is being transferred from weaker economies to faster growing economies.”

With China embarking on rapid “motorisation” – car sales in China leapfrogged those in the US in 2010 – the outlook is for repeated oil price spikes and recessions. We appear now to be entering the second peak oil recession, says Kopits, and others will follow. For the time being this is a problem for the west, but prices could rise to levels that are unsupportable even for China. On this view, peak oil is as much an economic construct as a geological one.

Analysts at Deutsche Bank are more optimistic, and predict that a final oil price spike to $175 in 2015 will lead to rapid electrification of transport and relieve pressure on the oil supply. But Kopits is doubtful that we can escape so easily. “Buckle up,” he concludes, “we’re in for a bumpy ride.”

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An oil crash is on its way and we should be ready

New Scientist has a rather pessimistic article by Jeremy Leggett on peak oil and related topics - An oil crash is on its way and we should be ready.

FIVE years ago the world was in the grip of a financial crisis that is still reverberating around the globe. Much of the blame for that can be attributed to weaknesses in human psychology: we have a collective tendency to be blind to the kind of risks that can crash economies and imperil civilisations.

Today, our risk blindness is threatening an even bigger crisis. In my book The Energy of Nations, I argue that the energy industrys leaders are guilty of a risk blindness that, unless action is taken, will lead to a global crash – and not just because of the climate change they fuel.

Let me begin by explaining where I come from. I used to be a creature of the oil and gas industry. As a geologist on the faculty at Imperial College London, I was funded by BP, Shell and others, and worked on oil and gas in shale deposits, among other things. But I became worried about societys overdependency on fossil fuels, and acted on my concerns.

In 1989, I quit Imperial College to become a climate campaigner. A decade later I set up a solar energy business. In 2000 I co-founded a private equity fund investing in renewables.

In these capacities, I have watched captains of the energy and financial industries at work – frequently close to, often behind closed doors – as the financial crisis has played out and the oil price continued its inexorable rise. I have concluded that too many people across the top levels of business and government have found ways to close their eyes and ears to systemic risk-taking. Denial, I believe, has become institutionalised.

As a result of their complacency we face four great risks. The first and biggest is no surprise: climate change. We have way more unburned conventional fossil fuel than is needed to wreck the climate. Yet much of the energy industry is discovering and developing unconventional deposits – shale gas and tar sands, for example – to pile onto the fire, while simultaneously abandoning solar power just as it begins to look promising. It has been vaguely terrifying to watch how CEOs of the big energy companies square that circle.

Second, we risk creating a carbon bubble in the capital markets. If policymakers are to achieve their goal of limiting global warming to 2 °C, 60 to 80 per cent of proved reserves of fossil fuels will have to remain in the ground unburned. If so, the value of oil and gas companies would crash and a lot of people would lose a lot of money. ...

Third, we risk being surprised by the boom in shale gas production. That, too, may prove to be a bubble, maybe even a Ponzi scheme. Production from individual shale wells declines rapidly, and large amounts of capital have to be borrowed to drill replacements. This will surprise many people who make judgement calls based on the received wisdom that limits to shale drilling are few. But I am not alone in these concerns.

Even if the US shale gas drilling isnt a bubble, it remains unprofitable overall and environmental downsides are emerging seemingly by the week. According to the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality, whole towns in Texas are now running out of water, having sold their aquifers for fracking. I doubt that this is a boom that is going to appeal to the rest of the world; many others agree.

Fourth, we court disaster with assumptions about oil depletion. Most of us believe the industry mantra that there will be adequate flows of just-about-affordable oil for decades to come. I am in a minority who dont. Crude oil production peaked in 2005, and oil fields are depleting at more than 6 per cent per year, according to the International Energy Agency. The much-hyped 2 million barrels a day of new US production capacity from shale needs to be put in context: we live in a world that consumes 90 million barrels a day.

It is because of the sheer prevalence of risk blindness, overlain with the pervasiveness of oil dependency in modern economies, that I conclude system collapse is probably inevitable within a few years.

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Latest Iraqi Oil Production Stats

Stuart at Early Warning has an update on oil production in Iraq - Latest Iraqi Oil Production Stats.

Here are the latest Iraqi oil production statistics (recall the history). The new slightly higher plateau of 2.6-2.7mbd that was first achieved at the end of last year has held since then.

At this point, compared to when I was first discussing this (eg here and here) it seems to me that the political stability risks have declined considerably. It now seems unlikely that Iraq will collapse into disorder when the US finally leaves altogether (though not impossible I suppose). However, there is still some level of armed insurrection, and Iraq still has to contend with a very old inadequate set of infrastructure (oil and otherwise) which will have to be upgraded and replaced.

So my favored scenario at this point would be that Iraq will eventually produce far more oil than it does today, but that the expansion will be slow and fitful, especially at first, and will fall behind the articulated schedule of the oil ministry. Peak production for this country is probably at least a decade away.

Oil and Gas Journal has a long article on Iraqs oil reserves by Tariq Shafiq - A veteran revisits Iraqs oil resource and lists implications of the magnitude.

Iraq’s oil reserves, revised to 143.5 billion bbl in late 2010 from the 115 billion bbl official figure that held for several years, will no doubt turn out to be much larger than the late-2010 estimate.

The Iraq Ministry of Oil also announced an estimate of potential reserves of 215 billion bbl.

In the nationalized decades leading up to the 1990s, 155 wells were drilled on 113 structures, many of which are 10 km long. Even structures that produced oil were not sufficiently investigated. The concept of what was commercial was influenced by oil priced at $1-3/bbl and conservative recovery factors.

The exploratory drilling density in Iraq’s 441,840 sq km is 1 well/2,900 sq km. Iraq is the least-explored Middle East country.

Iraq’s known oil reserves are roughly distributed almost one fourth in formations of Tertiary age, nearly three fourths in those of Cretaceous age, and a small percentage in Jurassic/Triassic.

Of 530 structural anomalies identified by geophysical means, the 113 wells established the presence of oil in 73. Reinterpretation of seismic using state of the art computer software indicates the presence of a large number of stratigraphic traps and many more structural anomalies than the delineated 530.

The new identified stratigraphic and structural anomalies, remaining identified but undrilled ones, untested shows, the many discovered fields—especially those in the south that are yet to be tested in the deeper (Lower Cretaceous, Jurassic, and Triassic) horizons, and Jurassic/Triassic oil resources in the relatively virgin Western Desert and the Folded Zone along the Zagros Belt will no doubt increase Iraq’s oil reserves to or beyond the latest estimates.

The author believes Iraq to be capable of increasing its oil production rate to 10 million b/d and possibly even to 12 million b/d.

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Kjell Aleklett Phil Hart Peak Oil Presentation Videos

TOD ANZ has a post including some videos of peak oil talks delivered in Australia recently - Kjell Aleklett & Phil Hart - Peak Oil Presentation Videos.

On 24th November last year, Beyond Zero Emissions and GAMUT (Australasian Centre for the Governance and Management of Urban Transport) held a peak oil evening with the visiting Professor and ASPO President Kjell Aleklett. I also spoke following Kjell, concentrating more on Australian factors and cultural aspects of peak oil since Prof Aleklett had already overwhelmed the audience with the technical aspects!

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Crippled Kashagan oil project a bureaucratic nightmare

I was over in Perth late last year and it was interesting to see how the end of the mining (construction) boom is impacting on the locals. The engineering types are in austerity mode while the technology folk are much less affected - with a new focus on "efficiency projects to try and squeeze more value from the massive investments made over the past decade.

Oil and gas services work has dried up to the point where one friend was forced to start looking at opportunities offshore (after following his once 120 person team into redundancy). He noted that the pay available elsewhere is far less than most Perth engineers have become accustomed too, and was considering heading to Kazahkstan for his next job.

Kashagan remains one of the larger projects underway worldwide - Reuters report that its not progressing all that well - Crippled Kashagan oil project a bureaucratic nightmare.

Giant Kazakh oilfield Kashagan, which was brought to a halt by leaks shortly after start-up last year, is grappling with a bureaucratic "nightmare" on top of its engineering troubles as it strives for commercial production in 2014.

The scale and complexity of the worlds most expensive standalone oil project led its seven partners away from the traditional single operator command-and-control model, where one of the larger companies takes charge while the others provide support and share the risks, costs and rewards. ...

The Caspian Sea project aims to exploit the biggest oil discovery in decades, producing a peak of 1.66 million barrels a day - as much oil as OPEC member Angola, from a reserve almost as big as Brazils. Much of it is built on artificial islands to avoid damage from pack ice in a shallow sea that freezes for five months a year in temperatures that drop below minus 30 degrees Celsius (-22F).

The field extends over 3,375 square kilometres (1,303 sq miles), and the whole onshore and offshore site is bigger still. The oil is 4,200 metres (4,590 yards) below the seabed, at very high pressure, and the associated gas reaching the surface is mixed with some of the highest concentrations of toxic, metal-eating hydrogen sulphide (H2S) ever encountered.

Kashagan has cost an estimated $50 billion so far, five times early projections, and its 13-year life is a tale mostly of delay.

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Commodity supercycle in rude health despite shale oil

Ambrose Evans Pritchard has his own farewell to The Oil Drum at The Daily Telegraph, remaining skeptical that weve got an endless supply of oil just waiting to flow out of the ground - Commodity supercycle in rude health despite shale.

The Oil Drum is closing down after eight years, giving up the long struggle to alert us all to "peak oil" and the dangers of an energy crunch. Readers have been drifting away. The theme has gone out of fashion, eclipsed by shale and fracking in the US. ...

But though fracking is a Godsend, let us not lose our heads. The US Energy Department expects shale oil to add 3.1m bpd to Americas oil output by 2020, a remarkable feat but far less than the 5.4m estimates of a much-cited study by Leonardo Maugeri at Harvard.

The depletion rate on rigs at the Bakken field in North Dakota - the biggest US shale field - is precipitous. Output falls 30pc within two years, and a third is leaking into the air. Shale bears say average declines are nearer 70pc in the first year, and dismiss the whole craze as a bubble.

That is going too far. The technology is improving every week. The decline rate may flatten over time. Yet claims of a 100-year bonanza in the US are wishful thinking. "The upper limit of supply is likely closer to 23 years using present day rates of consumption," said the Eos report.

Kevin Norrish from Barclays said US drillers have already tapped the "best plays" for shale, with newer Utica ventures in the north east of the US and Canada coming up short. The biggest productivity leaps may already have happened. "We expect a steep slowdown in the rate of tight oil production growth from the middle of this decade onward," he said.

Barclays is defiantly holding to a Brent crude forecast of $184 in 2020, betting that spare capacity in global output will prove thinner than supposed, and that oil shocks will come back to haunt us.

We should think of shale as one-generation play for the US, enough to ensure American superpower primacy into the middle of the century. Whether the rest of the world can follow suit in any meaningful time-frame is an open question. Boston Consulting Group said there were 110,000 shale wells in the US and Canada by the end of last year, and just 200 in all other countries combined. Argentina, Poland and Ukraine may try to get going after 2015 but they have almost no service infrastructure, and all score badly on "ease of doing business". Australia may do better from 2017 onwards.

China has the worlds biggest reserves on paper. It is itching to start but much of its shale is in the north-west desert where there is no water, and frackers have yet to find a viable extraction process without water. Not one of the 19 drilling awards issued by the Communist authorities in January went to companies with oil and gas experience. They were mostly power utilities or coal miners.

Even if China seizes the prize, it will first have to build a vast network of pipelines. That will take a great deal of energy, long before shale supply reaches the market. ...

We all love a fresh narrative but consensus has swung too fast from the 2008 oil panic to the energy complacency of 2013, and done so on slender evidence. As matters stand, peak cheap oil remains an incontrovertible fact. To Oil Drum, a fond farewell.

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Chevron Uses Solar Thermal Steam to Extract Oil in California

Bloomberg has an article on enhanced oil recovery using solar thermal energy in California - Chevron Uses Solar-Thermal Steam to Extract Oil in California.

Chevron Corp. (CVX), the second-largest U.S. oil company, began extracting crude from a southern California field using steam produced by a 29-megawatt solar- thermal power plant. BrightSource Energy Inc.’s system uses mirrors to focus sunlight on a boiler at Chevron’s Coalinga, California, enhanced oil recovery project, the solar company said in a statement after extraction began today.

Solar-thermal technology companies such as BrightSource are targeting industrial users in the oil-recovery and food- processing industries as customers as well as power generation. Mining and metals processing are also very promising, especially in remote areas where power can also be generated along with heat, Charlie Ricker, BrightSource senior vice president of business development, said today in an interview. ...

The Coalinga plant consists of 3,822 mirror systems, or heliostats, each with two 10-foot (3-meter) by 7-foot mirrors mounted on a 6-foot steel pole focusing light on a 327-foot solar tower. Steam created by the heat is fed into the oil reservoir, making it easier to bring to the surface. The system began generating steam in August, Kristin Hunter, a spokeswoman for Oakland, California-based BrightSource, said today in an e- mail.

Areva SA’s Areva Solar, Seville, Spain-based Abengoa SA, Erlangen, Germany-based Solar Millennium AG (S2M) and Burbank, California-based eSolar Inc. are competing with BrightSource with their own solar-thermal technology. Glasspoint Solar Inc., based in Fremont, California, makes solar steam generators for the oil and gas industry using mirrored troughs inside of glasshouse enclosures to protect the mirrors.

Enhanced oil recovery, or EOR, fits very well with solar temperatures, Glasspoint Vice President John O’Donnell, said today in an interview.

Some 32 percent of California’s industrial and commercial gas use is for EOR as its use grows in the U.S. and all over the world, O’Donnell said. The state produces about 40% of its oil using EOR and in a few years that will grow to 60%, he said.

The company can produce heat for EOR for about $3 per million British thermal units, compared with about $4 for a comparable natural-gas plant in the U.S. and between $10 to $12 for other conventional solar thermal technologies, O’Donnell said. “We are the only ones below natural gas right now in the U.S.”

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Peak oil can fuel a change for the better

The SMH has a rare mainstream media opinion piece on peak oil (albeit of the doomy circa-2005 variety) - Peak oil can fuel a change for the better.

The advent of peak oil means we should prepare for a downscaling of our highly energy and resource-intensive lifestyles.

What is peak oil and why does it matter? And what effect will it have on the Western lifestyles we take for granted? These are not questions that many people are asking themselves yet, but this decade is going to change everything. Peak oil is upon us.

Peak oil does not mean that the world is about it run out of oil. It refers to the point at which the supply of oil can no longer increase. There is lots of the stuff left; its just getting much more difficult to find and extract, which means it is getting very hard, and perhaps impossible, to increase the overall flow of oil out of the ground. When the flow can no longer increase, that is peak oil. Supply will then plateau for a time and eventually enter terminal decline. This is the future that awaits us, because oil is a finite, non-renewable resource.

The prospect of peak oil is no longer a fringe theory held only by a few scaremongers. It is a geological reality that has been acknowledged even by conservative, mainstream institutions such as the International Energy Agency, the UK Industry Task Force and the United States military. Even the chief executive of one of the worlds largest oil companies, Total, said recently he expected demand to outstrip supply as early as 2014 or 2015. Given how fundamental oil is to our economies, this signifies the dawn of a new era in the human story.

While the supply of oil is stagnating, demand is still growing considerably. China and India are industrialising at an extraordinary pace, requiring huge amounts of oil, and even in the Middle East and Russia – the main oil exporting regions – oil consumption is growing fast. What this means is that competition is escalating over access to the limited supply, and basic economic principles dictate that when supply stagnates and demand increases, oil is going to get much more expensive – a situation that is already playing out.

The problem of peak oil, therefore, is not that we are running out of oil, but that we have already run out of cheap oil. Currently the world consumes about 89 million barrels a day, or 32 billion barrels a year. Those mind-boggling figures are why oil is called the lifeblood of industrial civilisation. It should be clear enough, then, that when oil gets more expensive, all things dependent on oil get more expensive. Since almost all products today are dependent on oil for transport (among other things, such as plastic), the age of expensive oil will eventually price much global trade out of the market. Peak oil probably means peak globalisation.

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Peak oil not climate change worries most Britons

Reuters has an interesting column on some polling done in Britain - Peak oil, not climate change worries most Britons.

Most people in Britain want to reduce reliance on fossil fuels, but due more to fears of shortages and rising prices than to fears about climate change, according to a poll developed by researchers at Cardiff University and funded by the UK Energy Research Centre.

Nearly 2,500 people were surveyed across England, Scotland and Wales in August 2012. The results, published on Tuesday in a report on "Transforming the UK energy system: public values, attitudes and acceptability," provide a trove of information about public opinion on climate and energy policy.

By a large majority, respondents were either very concerned (24 percent) or fairly concerned (50 percent) about climate change and thought it was partly (48 percent) or mainly (28 percent) caused by human activity. Only a minority thought fears about climate change have been exaggerated (30 percent), though more expressed uncertainty about what the effects will really be (59 percent).

Nearly everyone agreed with the statement that Britain needs "to radically change how we produce and use energy by 2050". ...

By overwhelming majorities, those polled were fairly or very concerned gas and electricity would become unaffordable (83 percent); Britain will become too dependent on energy from other countries (83 percent); the country will have no alternatives if fossil fuels are no longer available (83 percent); and petrol will become unaffordable (78 percent).

Nearly four out of five respondents agreed the country should reduce its reliance on fossil fuels (79 percent). When asked for their reasons, respondents cited concerns about fossil fuels running out, being unsustainable or non-renewable (48 percent), costly (7 percent) and implied dependence on other countries (5 percent), compared with worries they are harmful to the environment and polluting (19 percent) or contribute to climate change (17 percent).

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Peak cheap oil is an incontrovertible fact

Im always a little dubious about Ambrose Evans-Pritchard but this column (wondering about the hype over Maugeris mistaken analysis of peak oil) is worth a read - Peak cheap oil is an incontrovertible fact.

Brent crude jumped to $115 a barrel last week. Petrol costs in Germany and across much of Europe are now at record levels in local currencies. Diesel is above the political pain threshold of $4 a gallon in the US, hence reports circulating last week that the International Energy Agency (IEA) is preparing to release strategic reserves.

Barclays Capital expects a “monster” effect this quarter as the crude market tightens by 2.4m barrels a day (bpd), with little extra supply in sight. Goldman Sachs said the industry is chronically incapable of meeting global needs. “It is only a matter of time before inventories and OPEC spare capacity become effectively exhausted, requiring higher oil prices to restrain demand,” said its oil guru David Greely.

This is a remarkable state of affairs given the world economy is close to a double-dip slump right now, the latest relapse in our contained global depression. ...

So we face a world where Brent crude trades at over $100 even in recession. Fears of an Israeli strike on Iran may have spiked the price a bit, though Intrade’s contract for an attack is well below levels earlier this year. Iranian sanctions may have cut supply by more than the extra 900,000 bpd pumped by Saudi Arabia. Japan’s increased reliance on oil since switching off most of its nuclear reactors has played its part.

Yet the deeper force at work is the relentless fall in output from the North Sea and the Gulf of Mexico, endless disappointment in Russia because of Kremlin pricing policies, and the escalating cost of extraction from deep sea fields.

Nothing has really changed since the IEA warned four years ago that the world must invest $20 trillion in energy projects over the next 25 years to feed the industrial revolutions of Asia and head off an almighty crunch. The urgency has merely been disguised by the Long Slump.

We learned in the 2006-2008 blow-off that China is now the key driver of global oil prices, with consumption rising each year by 0.5m bpd -- now a total 9.2m bpd in a world market of 90m bpd. Demand is broadly flat in Europe and America.

So what will happen when China latest spending blitz gains traction? The regions have unveiled a colossal new spree on airports, roads, aeronautics, and industrial parks: a purported $240bn each for Tianjin and Chongqing, $160bn for Guangdong, $130bn for Changsha, and so forth. Sleepy Guizhou has trumped them all with $470bn. Your mind goes numb.

What will happen too when car sales in China surpass 20m next year, as expected by the China Association of Automobile Manufacturers? ...

World opinion has swung a little too cavalierly from the Peak Oil panic four years ago to a new consensus that America’s shale revolution -- and what it promises for China, Argentina, and Europe -- has largely solved the problem.

Much has been made of “Oil: The Next Revolution” by Harvard’s Leonardo Maugeri, who forecasts an era of bountiful supply and cheap oil as global output capacity rises by almost 18m bpd to 110m bpd by 2020.

Sadad al-Huseini, former vice-president of Saudi Aramco, has a written a testy rebuttal, arguing that Dr Maugeri assumes a global decline rate of 2pc a year from oil fields compared to the IEA’s estimate of 6.7pc. There alone lies the gap between crunch and glut. ...

The shale revolution has profound implications for America’s role in the world and the global balance of power, but let us not get carried away. Oil experts noticed how many crews in the Bakken field were told to stand down when crude prices dipped earlier this summer. “Supposedly cheap shale turned out to be rather expensive shale in that, as soon as Brent fell to $90 per barrel, a large proportion of US shale oil in key regions seemed to lose all its rent,” said Paul Horsnell from Barclays Capital.

Prichards column points to this article by Sadad al-Huseini - Dont Count on Revolution in Oil Supply.

Leonardo Maugeris recent paper Oil: The Next Revolution on the presumed future abundance of oil supplies rejects the pessimistic outlook of limited increases in oil capacity over the next decade. It suggests global oil capacity will exceed 110 million barrels per day by the end of the decade, putting an immediate end to concerns regarding constrained long-term oil supplies. This conclusion is based on an assessment of new projects with a reported capacity of 49 million b/d before a downward adjustment to 29 million b/d to allow for completion risks and reserves depletion. Maugeri holds two PhDs, one in Political Science and one in Economics, and has extensive executive experience with ENI in strategies and developments and in petrochemicals.

In putting forth this optimistic thesis, Maugeri apparently sets aside a variety of technical realities, including the difference between natural gas liquids (NGLs) and conventional oil, reserves depletion versus capacity declines, and proven reserves as opposed to speculative resources.

The report mixes NGLs, which feed petrochemicals and domestic or industrial fuel applications, with conventional oil, which is the main source for transportation fuels. When fractionated, NGLs yield propane, butane and light naphtha. These products cannot replace oil distillates such as gasoline, diesel or jet fuel.

For example, NGLs grew from 7 million b/d in 2003 to an estimated 12 million b/d in 2011 but provided no relief to the demand for transportation fuels, which was surging across those years. The growth in NGLs is now forecast by the IEA to reach an ambitious 20 million b/d by 2030. Impressive as this may be, NGLs will remain at best marginally relevant to transportation applications until widespread changes occur in the technology and infrastructure of the auto and trucking industries. Given cost and complexities, there is no evidence that this is likely to happen within this decade.

In regard to capacity declines, the report appears to confuse oil reserves depletion with capacity declines. In the world of petroleum engineering, depletion quantifies residual reserves in the ground, while declines define a reservoirs ability to sustain a given level of production over time. Incremental reserves in modern discoveries are added early in a discoverys life while production declines are a subsequent development related to reservoir factors including changing fluid compositions and diminishing reservoir energy. Maugeris suggestion that incremental reserves may offset capacity declines mixes up speculative exploration variables with reservoir engineering realities.

The report takes exception to the IEAs 2008 estimate of an average 6.7% global oil capacity decline and offers an equivalent estimate of less than 2% per year. This low estimate is apparently based on the observation of historical production rates from major oil producing countries. It is not clear how the author extracted the convoluted effects of offsetting market volatility, spare capacity utilization, natural production declines, and ongoing new capacity investments from such historical trends.

The IEA’s 2008 study, on the other hand, applies well-established petroleum engineering principles to 800 post-peak fields that make up the majority of global oil supplies. The natural decline rates of these fields were reported to average 3.4% for 54 supergiant fields, 6.5% for scores of giant fields and the 10.4% decline rate for hundreds of large fields. At the IEAs 6.7% level of capacity declines, the current 74 million b/d of conventional oil supplies (which exclude NGLs, biofuels, nonconventionals and various other liquids) would require 5 million b/d of supplemental new capacity annually just to maintain a flat level of supply. Based on these assessments, Maugeri’s 29 million b/d of "risked" new capacity would only replace declines through 2017. Even the full 49 million b/d of new projects would only extend current liquids production on a flat trajectory to 2021.

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More Signs of ‘Peak Us’ in New Study of ‘Peak Oil Demand’

Andrew Revkin at the NYT has an article looking at a study on peak oil occurring due to demand factors rather than supply factors - More Signs of ‘Peak Us’ in New Study of ‘Peak Oil Demand’.

Back in 2010, I asked this question: “Which Comes First – Peak Everything or Peak Us?” My focus was whether humans could use the gift of foresight to curb resource appetites in ways that would avoid having the peak imposed on us by shortages or human-induced environmental shifts like climate disruption.

There are growing signs the answer is yes. First came work pointing to “peak travel.” Then I wrote about a study foreseeing “peak farmland” — an end to the need to keep pressing into untrammeled ecosystems to expand agriculture.

Now comes this fascinating paper in Environmental Science & Technology: “Peak Oil Demand: The Role of Fuel Efficiency and Alternative Fuels in a Global Oil Production Decline.”

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Graph of the Day The Cost of Production Of Oil

TreeHugger points to a TOD post looking at the cost of production for oil from various sources - Does Peak Oil Even Matter?. The summary - "Peak Oilers have always pointed out that we will never run out of oil, it will just get a lot more expensive. And when it does, it will crush the economy" - might well be the view of a lot of peak oilers, but is entirely wrong - it should be rephrased as "And when it does, we will become both more efficient in our use of oil and replace it with alternatives (aka. convert our transport systems to use electricity and source this from renewable energy sources)"

Whenever we speak of Peak Oil, the optimists point out that the technology for finding replacements will turn up as the prices rise; look at what has happened with the oil sands and with shale gas. But as this graph shows, each alternative just gets more expensive.

A fascinating article by David Murphy in The Oil Drum questions the logic that these expensive options prove that peak oil is not a problem. But Peak Oilers have always pointed out that we will never run out of oil, it will just get a lot more expensive. And when it does, it will crush the economy. Murphy writes:

Oil infiltrates almost every facet of an industrial economy, from personal disposable income, to manufacturing, to service sectors. Therefore higher oil prices restrain growth via declining discretionary consumption as individuals allocate more money towards gasoline and home heating, or as the cost of producing a good increases, etc. Chris Nelder described this situation succinctly, writing: "The true import of peak oil, therefore, may not be sustained high prices, but economic shrinkage. Demand will be destroyed long before oil gets to $200 a barrel.

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USGS report reduces estimate of oil in Alaska

The Anchorage Daily News reports that oil reserve numbers in Alaska have been reduced by the USGS - USGS report reduces estimate of oil in petroleum reserve.

Recent drilling results indicate that the National Petroleum Reserve-Alaska contains roughly a tenth of the oil that federal scientists had previously estimated, the U.S. Geological Survey announced Tuesday.

Instead, the federal agency said, natural gas is the dominant energy resource in the 23 million-acre reserve across northern Alaska, and in nearby state waters. The findings are based on more than 30 wells drilled and other exploration in the NPRA over the past decade.

The agencys findings are in sync with declining investment by some oil companies, which have shed more than a million acres of leases in the reserve and are spending much less money on purchasing new ones.

And yet, the agency scientist who published the new estimates cautioned against overreacting. He stressed on Tuesday that the reserve does hold some decent-sized accumulations of oil -- particularly in the northeast, near Teshekpuk Lake -- and its potential for gas is "just phenomenal."

But until a North Slope gas pipeline is built, "a gas discovery is not a lot better than a dry hole," said the scientist, David Houseknecht.

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Another Comment On The End Of The Oil Drum

I quite like this comment on Stuart Stanifords farewell to The Oil Drum as a quick summary of the current state of peak oil.

The one small disagreement I have is that things are boring at the moment. Although liquids are usually measured by volume, what really counts is the net energy which they yield to society. This is more nuanced and complicated than the original peak oil story based on conventional oil alone, but as such is rather more interesting.

The shallow upward gradient in C+C is entirely due to tar sands and tight oil, both marginal sources of supply at large environmental cost. Tar sands relies on cheap natural gas to be profitable. Tight oil is a classic bubble with misallocation of capital, woeful regulation and sharly diminishing returns. The situation with tight oil in particular seems to be quite dynamic, with significant yearly changes to flow rates, drilling and average returns.

An oft used metaphor is the cartoon coyote running off the edge of the cliff, legs pumping furiously. How long can the frantic motion delay the inevitable onset of gravity? Were seeing the dregs of liquid fuels being sucked out of the earth in a desperate attempt to keep our hydrocarbon addiction going. Each month sees a deterioration in EROI, so net energy is likely flat or at best rising very slowly.

Assuming peak oil is defined as maximum rate of net energy flow, then I suspect we are not many years away. Tar sands can continue to expand slowly it seems, but tight oil will peak in volume terms this decade, and earlier in net energy terms.

I can understand that the original TOD cohort are feeling tired, after the peak oil debate has taken some unexpected twists and were in an apparently stable phase. But dig down into the detail and IMO the key elements of peak oil are playing out in front of us, today, this year and for the next few years. In many ways its a privilege to see and understand whats happening at such a critical inflexion point. In other ways is scary, because most of the world is still deep in denial and well have to adapt in uncomfortable ways once the net energy peak is passed (we aint seen nothing yet).

All the main TOD contibutors should feel proud of providing such a valuable role in shaping awareness of peak oil and its likely remifications.

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Has Peak Oil Come To The Non Opec World Maybe

Forbes has a look at peak oil production in the non OPEC world - Has Peak Oil Come To The Non-Opec World? Maybe..

The world’s biggest oil companies put in a pretty pathetic performance in the second quarter of 2011. Not in terms of earnings — those were great, with Exxon posting $10.7 billion and Royal Dutch Shell doing $8 billion. Just what you’d expect with Brent crude at a lofty $120 a barrel.



Where the results were disappointing was in the barrels. Of the 16 big U.S. and European oil companies studied by Deutsche Bank analyst Paul Sankey, 14 of them saw their production of petroleum decline in the quarter. Collectively, the drop amounted to 12% of total liquids volumes, or 1.2 million bpd. Their average output for the quarter totalled, 14.67 million bpd. Even excluding the effect of Libya’s issues, the decline was 8%.



Only Exxon and Shell managed 1% volume gains in liquids.



The situation didn’t get much better when Sankey looked at other big non-OPEC producers. Brazil’s supposed growth engine Petrobras was down a touch, as were Russia’s Lukoil and TNK-BP and China’s Sinopec. Rosneft (2.2 million bpd) and PetroChina (2.4 million bpd) did eke out gains of 2% and 4%.



Overall, the producers of 31 million bpd (out of a worldwide total of roughly 86 million bpd) saw their output fall 4%. No wonder Sankey titled his report “The Death of Non-OPEC.”



OPEC volumes, by contrast, were up 2% in the quarter, figures Sankey.



So what’s going on? Is Peak Oil here, at least in the non-OPEC part of the world? Maybe so. “In identifying mega-themes, we have argued that the shift from the 20th to 21st century represents the end of the oil age and the beginning of the global electricity age,” writes Sankey. “The concentration of remaining (abundant) oil reserves into OPEC hands derives an obvious corollary: the end of growth from non-OPEC supply.”



The supermajors are finding it harder and harder to pry away the remaining megaprojects from state-run oil companies. Of the biggest OPEC members like Saudi Arabia, Iran, Venezuela and Iraq, only the latter is eager to bring in the majors to help develop reserves.



Add in the fact that natural decline rates on big fields average 5% a year, and it will become ever harder for Big Oil to stay big. Christophe de Margerie, the pragmatic chief executive of French giant Total, believes that global peak oil will hit within five years (see my story on Total: “High Friends In Low Places”).

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